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Introduction
The World Health Organization (WHO) was born after the
devastation of World War II, as a normative agency endowed
with unprecedented constitutional powers. But even as it
has achieved stunning successes, such as the eradication of
smallpox, it has failed to live up to the exalted expectations
of the postwar health and human rights movement e
exemplified most recently by its inadequate response to the
Ebola epidemic. Our aim is to offer innovative ideas for

restoring the Organization to its leadership position by
exercising its normative authority,d even as it faces a crowded and often chaotic global health architecture. We begin
by examining the WHO's fundamental tensions and core
functions. Next we turn to the Organization's reform agenda,
providing an overview of the process and considering six
areas in which the WHO is particularly in need of improvement. We conclude with a few reflections on the future of
the Organization. Throughout the article, we draw on lessons learned from the response to the recent outbreak of
Ebola in West Africa.

*
This article is largely derived from the chapter on the World Health Organization in: Lawrence O. Gostin, Global Health Law. Cambridge: Harvard University Press (2014).
* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ1 202 662 9038; fax: þ1 202 662 9055.
E-mail address: Gostin@law.georgetown.edu (L.O. Gostin).
d
By normative authority, we mean the Organization's power to shape or influence global rules and norms and to monitor compliance.
This can be contrasted with, for instance, the Organization's technical role (e.g., providing medical or logistical advice on a vaccination
campaign or monitoring and reporting on the global spread of an epidemic).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.puhe.2015.05.002
0033-3506/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Fundamental tensions
The WHO, with its unmatched expertise and constitutional
mandate, is well positioned to lead a sustained improvement
in world health. But the Organization faces critical institutional tensions that significantly impair its functioning:1
❖ A Servant to Member States. Member states demand faithfulness to their often-conflicting demands. They elect the
Director-General (D-G), chart the work plan, approve the
budget, and steer the overall direction. Such tight control
can chill the Secretariat from acting as the moral leader for
world health and advocating passionately on behalf of the
most disadvantaged;
❖ A Paucity of Resources. WHO resources are entirely incommensurate with the scope and scale of global health needs.
The agency's budget pales in comparison with national
health budgets, despite its vast worldwide responsibilities;
❖ Earmarked Funding. The flow of funds is not only inadequate, but also highly restricted. The agency must have
greater authority to direct its resources to where needs are
greatest;
❖ Weak Governance. The WHO lacks critical institutional
structures for financial management, transparency, priority setting, and accountability. The Organization also needs
to harness the creativity of non-state actors, enable them
to fully participate in decision-making, while managing
conflicts of interest;
❖ Excessive Regionalization. Global policies and programs
cannot be effectively implemented due to the WHO's
decentralized structure. The regions are not fully branches
of the Organization, but have wide autonomy. The autonomy of the regions can hamper the WHO's ability to speak
with a single voice and exercise global leadership.

Mission and core functions
The WHO Constitution created a normative institution with
extraordinary powers. The Constitution's first Article enunciates a bold mission: ‘the attainment by all peoples of the
highest possible level of health.’ The Preamble defines health
as ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being
and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.’ The Preamble, moreover, places human rights as a central theme,
affirming, ‘the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being
without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic
or social condition.’
The Constitution unmistakably establishes the WHO as the
premier global health leader, stating that it should ‘act as the
directing and coordinating authority on international health
work’ e working in close collaboration with UN agencies,
national health ministries, and professional organizations
(Article 2).
Article 2 grants the WHO extensive normative powers to
carry out its mission, authorizing the World Health Assembly
(WHA) to adopt ‘conventions, agreements and regulations,

and make recommendations with respect to international
health matters.’ The Organization principally exercises its
normative authority through ‘soft’ power e either constitutionally authorized ‘recommendations’ or more informal
action by the Assembly, Board, and/or Secretariat. The Organization rarely exerts its constitutional authority to exercise
‘hard’ power by negotiating binding international law.

Recommendations: ‘soft’ global health norms
The WHO's most salient normative activity has been to create
‘soft’ standards underpinned by science, ethics, and human
rights. Although not binding, soft norms are influential,
particularly at the national level where they can be incorporated into legislation, regulation, or guidelines.
Article 23 grants the Assembly the authority ‘to make
recommendations to Members,’ while Article 62 requires
states to report annually on the action taken to comply with
recommendations. The WHA's two most prominent recommendations are the International Code of Marketing of BreastMilk Substitutes (1981) and the Global Code of Practice on the
International Recruitment of Health Personnel (2010).
Apart from these notable exceptions, the Assembly rarely
explicitly invokes Article 23. In practice, however, failing to
invoke Article 23 appears inconsequential. States are not
obliged to comply with recommendations. Moreover, WHO
has not enforced Article 62 reporting requirements, rendering
the difference between constitutional recommendations and
other soft norms less significant.
The WHO uses a variety of legal and policy tools to set soft
norms, with varying levels of institutional support. First, the
WHA can pass a resolution, which expresses the will of
member states, representing the highest level of commitment. Second, the Secretariat can set a standard on a grant of
authority from the Assembly or Board, but without the governing authority's formal approval. Finally, the Secretariat can
convene expert committees and disseminate their findings
without formal endorsement.
The more directly the Assembly approves the normative
content, the more likely that member states will support and
implement the standard. To build political support for the
Organization's most important initiatives, the Assembly
adopts a ‘request-development-endorsement’ process. The
WHA, for example, charged the Secretariat with developing
both the Breast-Milk Substitutes and Health Personnel
Recruitment Codes, followed by formal endorsement. Beyond
Article 23 recommendations, the Assembly has placed its full
weight behind major Global Strategies, such as on ‘Diet,
Physical Activity and Health’ and on ‘The Harmful Use of
Alcohol.’
Most soft norms are less formal than full-fledged regulatory texts such as codes of practice or even broad policy
frameworks such as global strategies. Given the diverse and
complex technical fields within WHO's purview, the Organization has developed a variety of mechanisms for gathering
and disseminating expert advice. The Secretariat convenes
expert advisory panels and committees to provide technical
guidance.2 The Expert Committee on Drug Dependence, for
example, guides the agency in the discharge of functions
assigned under the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
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(1961), while the Expert Committee on the Selection and Use of
Essential Medicines helps revise WHO's Model List of Essential
Medicines. Expert committee reports are advisory but can
exert influence on scientific development.
The WHO has established a network of collaborating centers linked to research institutes and universities to support
agency functions ranging from nursing, nutrition, and mental
health to human rights. The Global Outbreak Alert and
Response Network (GOARN) offers another salient example.
GOARN is a technical collaboration of institutions that pool
human and technical resources for the rapid identification,
confirmation, and response to disease outbreaks of international importance.

The negotiation of treaties: hard law
The WHO Constitution envisages a normative institution that
uses law and exercises power to proactively promote the
attainment of ‘the highest possible level of health.’ The WHO's
treaty-making powers are extraordinary, with separate processes for the negotiation of ‘agreements’ or ‘conventions’ on
the one hand and ‘regulations’ on the other. What makes
WHO's law-making powers so special is that the Constitution
places affirmative obligations on sovereign states, which is
rare in international law. Despite WHO's impressive normative powers, modern international health law is remarkably
thin. The WHA has adopted only three treaties in its 65-year
history, two of which predate the agency d the Nomenclature Regulations and International Health Regulations.

Conventions or agreements
Article 19 grants the Health Assembly the power to ‘adopt
conventions or agreements’ by a two-thirds vote. A convention or agreement e binding international treaties e enters
into force for each member when the government accepts it in
accordance with national constitutional processes.
That much is standard treaty making, as states have unfettered choice. It is Article 20 that is exceptional in that it
directs members to ‘take action’ by accepting or rejecting the
convention or agreement within eighteen months after
adoption by the Assembly, presumably even if its WHA delegation voted ‘no.’ Each member must notify the D-G of the
action taken, such as submission of the treaty for ratification.
If a member does not accede to the treaty within the allotted
time, it must furnish a statement of reasons. This is a
powerful mechanism, highly unusual in international law, as
it requires states to seriously consider the treaty in accordance with national constitutional processes.
Articles 20 and 62 give the D-G monitoring authority, as
members that accede to a treaty must report annually towards
implementation. More generally, Chapter XIV of the Constitution requires members to report annually on ‘action taken’
and ‘progress’ in improving health, as well as to transmit
health information at the request of the EB.
The WHO did not negotiate a health convention until 2003,
when the Assembly adopted the Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC).3 Although a laudable achievement,
the FCTC is almost sui generis because it regulates the only
lawful product that is uniformly harmful. The FCTC was
politically feasible because the tobacco industry was vilified
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for obfuscating and denying scientific realities, engineering
tobacco to create nicotine dependence, engaging in deceptive
advertising, and targeting youth, women, and minorities.

Regulations
The WHA's quasi-legislative powers under Article 21 empower
the Organization to adopt regulations on a broad range of
health topics: (a) sanitation, quarantine and other interventions to prevent the international spread of disease; (b)
nomenclatures of diseases, causes of death, and public health
practice; (c) standards for diagnostic procedures for international use; (d) standards for the safety, purity, and potency of
biological and pharmaceutical products moving in international commerce, as well as the advertising and labeling of
such products.
The Organization's authority to adopt regulations is even
more remarkable than for agreements or conventions. By
Article 22, regulations enter into force for all members after
due notice is given of WHA adoption, except for members that
notify the D-G of rejection or reservations within a specified
time. Consequently, states must proactively ‘opt out’ or they
are automatically bound. Perhaps standing alone in international law, the Constitution permits the imposition of binding
obligations absent the state's express assent.
Indeed, the regulations may even enter into force for states
that notify the D-G of a reservation to the treaty. International
law has evolved since the adoption of the WHO Constitution.
Under the Vienna Convention and current state practice,
reservations that are not incompatible with the overall purpose of the treaty do not preclude a state from being recognized as a party to the treaty.

WHO Regulations No. 1
The nomenclature rule. Article 2 specifically empowers WHO to
establish and revise international nomenclatures of diseases,
causes of death, and public health practices, and to standardize
diagnostic procedures. The first Assembly in 1948 adopted
World Health Regulations No. 1, Nomenclature with Respect to
Diseases and Causes of Death, which formalized a long-standing
international process on disease classification. By providing
standardized nomenclature, the regulation facilitates the international comparison of morbidity and mortality data. The
Nomenclature Rule requires states to use the current version of
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD), now in its
10th edition, with the 11th Revision planned for 2017.

WHO Regulations No. 2
The International Health Regulations. The International Health
Regulations (IHR), as explained earlier, date back to a series of
European sanitary conferences held in the 19th century. The
Assembly adopted the International Sanitary Regulations (ISR)
in 1951 as WHO Regulations No. 2, covering six quarantinable
diseases e cholera, plague, epidemic (louse-borne) typhus,
relapsing fever, smallpox, and yellow fever. The 22nd Assembly (1969) revised and consolidated the ISR, which were
renamed the IHR. The 26th Assembly (1973) amended the IHR
in relation to cholera. The 34th Assembly amended the IHR to
exclude smallpox, in view of its global eradication. By the time
the 48th Assembly (1995) called for its fundamental revision,
the IHR applied only to cholera, plague, and yellow fever e the
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same three diseases discussed at the first Sanitary Conference
in 1851. The Assembly revised the IHR in 2005, which mostly
entered into force in 2007.
The WHO's normative powers, therefore, are impressive,
obliging sovereign states to submit agreements or conventions to a national political process and informing the Organization of the result. Its regulatory powers are even more farreaching, potentially binding states without the need for
formal signing and ratification. States, moreover, have
ongoing obligations to report annually on actions taken on
recommendations, conventions, and regulations (Art. 62).

‘Hard’ vs ‘soft’ norms
For the most part, the WHO has eschewed norm-setting,
preferring scientific and technical solutions to the deep-seated
problems of global health. And when it has acted normatively
it has mostly chosen ‘soft’ law in the form of guidelines, codes, or
recommendations rather than ‘hard’ binding international
law. Prominent scholars have chastised the WHO for its reluctance to create binding norms,4 although this is beginning to
change with the FCTC and IHR. Further, there may be good
reason for opting for soft instruments, which then U.S. Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton called ‘smart’ power.5

National health legislation
The WHO Constitution underscores the vital interaction between national and international law, with both required for
effective promotion of population health. Article 63 directs
member states to ‘communicate promptly to the Organization
important laws, regulations, official reports, and statistics pertaining to health.’ The OIHP published excerpts of national public
health legislation, which the WHO took over at its inception.6
The WHO's International Digest of Health Legislation (IDHL)
(Recueil International de L!egislation Sanitaire) publishes extracts
from, and translations of, public health laws and regulations
among member states. The Organization, however, has
decreased support for this vital constitutional function, both
by reducing IDHL staff and discontinuing print publication in
1999. Today, the Digest is available electronically, although it
provides only a fragmented and wholly incomplete account of
domestic health legislation.

The West African Ebola epidemic: a failure of
leadership
In 2014, one of the WHO's key normative instruments, the
International Health Regulations, faced a major test when an
outbreak of Ebola began its devastation of West Africa. The
treaty e and the Organization e were largely inadequate to the
task.
The first case of Ebola in West Africa seems to have appeared
in December 2013 in Guinea. By June 2014, the disease had
infected more than 500 people and killed at least 337, across 60
separate locations in three countries.7 Over the next months
!decins Sans Frontie
"res, one of the few organizations
Me
providing on-the-ground support, issued increasingly urgent
calls for a concerted international response.7 Nevertheless, it

took until August 8, more than four months after the first international spread was first detected and long past the point
where the epidemic had spun out of control, for the WHO to
declare the epidemic a public health emergency of international
concern (PHEIC), thus triggering obligations under the IHR.8 Ultimately it was the United Nations that led the global response,
with an unprecedented Security Council resolution and a UN
Mission.9 To date, the epidemic has killed over 10,000 people,
nearly all in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.
The Ebola epidemic presented an important test of the IHR,
revealing flaws in the regulations and in the WHO more
broadly. The declaration of a PHEIC took too long, and domestic public health capacity was grossly inadequate (despite
IHR requirements), revealing a failure in global cooperation to
develop these capacities. When the global response did finally
begin in earnest, it suffered from a lack of clear leadership.10
To WHO's credit, it has acknowledged some flaws in its
response. It has solicited an independent assessment of its efforts and its Executive Board (EB) held a special session on Ebola
during which it renewed calls for reform.11 In addition, four
major reforms were agreed at the 2015 WHA: combining WHO's
outbreak and emergency response programs; creating a $100
million contingency fund; developing a global health emergency
workforce; and launching an overhaul of the IHR. In the next
section, we discuss the WHO's reform agenda and how a
reformed WHO might be better equipped to respond the next
infectious disease epidemic, as well as to other threats to global
health.

The WHO's reform agenda
On March 10, 2011, the day before convening the D-G's Ad Hoc
Advisory Committee on Reforming the WHO, Margaret Chan
called together all staff at Headquarters, with regional staff
joining by satellite. She announced an alarming budget deficit
and staff lay-offs, calling for fundamental reform. That May,
the Assembly endorsed the reform agenda, while the EB
launched ‘a transparent member state-driven and inclusive
consultative process on WHO reform.’12
In 2012, the WHA and EB defined three reform objectives:
(1) improved health outcomes, with the WHO setting priorities
agreed by member states and partners; (2) greater coherence in
global health, with the WHO playing a leading role in enabling
multiple actors to become more effective; and (3) pursing
excellence that is effective, efficient, responsive, objective,
transparent, and accountable.13
The reform agenda reveals keen self-awareness of the
challenges, but why hasn't the agency been able to fully succeed? Why are so many allies concerned about the Organization's future? Why has it been so hard for the agency to
change and adapt? We conclude this paper with proposals to
ensure that the WHO can reclaim its rightful place as the
world's premier health organization.14,15

Exercise WHO's legal authority
As explained above, the WHO was formed as a normative
institution, charged with directing and coordinating global
health activities. The justification for norm-creation is not
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simply that it is constitutionally mandated, but also that it will
drive change far better than scientific and technical support
alone. Norm development can set the global health agenda,
guide priorities, harmonize activities, and influence the
behavior of key state and non-state actors.
If the WHO is to reassert its constitutional authority as a
normative institution, then what principles should it adopt?
What is the most effective combination of hard and soft
norms? And how can it facilitate implementation of, and
compliance with, health norms?

distribution of scarce experimental drugs, an issue of significant
concern during the outbreak. (The Organization does have one
such agreement, the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework, but it applies only narrowly.) A biomedical research and
development agreement could accelerate the development of
safe and effective treatments and vaccines, particularly for
neglected diseases like Ebola. And a broad global health
convention, grounded in the principles of human rights and
universal health coverage, can ready countries' health systems
to cope with the strain of epidemic disease.17

Human rights and global justice

Implementation and compliance

The WHO's history and constitutional design point to human
rights as a primary source for norm development. What is
striking about the postwar consensus is that the United Nations envisaged health and human rights as two great, intertwined social movements, with the UN Charter, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the WHO Constitution as
the defining instruments. The first two sentences of the
Constitution's Preamble define health expansively and proclaim ‘the highest attainable standard of health’ as a fundamental human right. The WHO was supposed to be the
vanguard of the right to health.
Yet despite notable achievements, the Organization has
been reticent to venture into norm-development, and rarely
invokes the right to health. It certainly has not been a leader in
the health and human rights movement, leaving that space to
civil society and the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to
health. The Assembly in 65 years has not passed a single
resolution on the right to health. Exemplifying states' reluctance, the U.S., in 2008, strenuously objected to an innocuous
WHO/Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights fact
sheet on the right to health, emphasizing ‘the seriousness of
our concerns’ and reiterating ‘our request that it be
rescinded.’16

If norms are to have ‘bite,’ they must include effective
mechanisms for accountability. Although WHO's comparative
advantage is not in policing, the agency is well constituted for
convening, monitoring, and reporting. The convening process
itself could lay the groundwork for gaining stakeholder ‘buyin.’ Once the normative instrument is adopted, ongoing
monitoring could provide a ‘feedback loop,’ with actors
reporting on progress. The lack of capacity in developing
countries remains a key challenge, requiring innovative
financing and technical assistance.
Traditionally, international instruments have been
directed primarily at states, leaving out multiple stakeholders.
Extending normative influence to businesses, foundations,
the media, and civil society could help ensure compliance.
Advocates could exert political influence and rally public
opinion. For example, NGOs could issue ‘shadow reports,’
holding stakeholders to account for failing to live up to their
promises.

‘Soft’ and ‘hard’ norms
The WHO has rarely exercised its law-making powers, negotiating only two major treaties e the International Health
Regulations and the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control. This represents a missed opportunity, as law can be a
powerful public health tool. Just as tobacco and health security transcend borders justifying the FCTC and IHR, so too do a
range of major health hazards, such as non-communicable
diseases, mental illness, and injuries.
Soft norms complement international law e a fact that the
WHO increasingly realizes with codes of practice, action
plans, and global strategies. States are more likely to buy into
expansive standards if they are not legally bound, providing
the WHO with an opportunity to issue bold guidance on highly
consequential issues, such as health systems, access to
essential medicines, and socio-economic determinants. The
Organization could go beyond declarations, reports, and
commissions by negotiating normative standards for adoption by state and non-state actors. Soft instruments, moreover, can become the building blocks for subsequent treaties,
with greater enforcement and accountability.
Legal agreements could have made for a stronger and more
efficient response to Ebola. An agreement on the equitable
sharing of drugs and other therapies could guide fairer

The all-of-society approach
The ‘all-of-government’ or ‘health-in-all-policies’ (HiAP)
approach recognizes that ministries of health cannot accomplish major reforms on their own. HiAP urges all government
departments to take health into account in their policies and
practices. Beyond governments, an ‘all-of-society’ approach
seeks to include all social sectors to achieve meaningful results,
such as businesses, foundations, the media, and academia.

Members must become shareholders
During the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Reforming the
WHO, the D-G said something telling, and brave.18 She
observed that member states do not behave as ‘shareholders’
with a genuine stake in the Organization's success. That
critique has a ring of truth. States, of course, do want the
agency to succeed, but they act in ways that thwart effective
action (a problem that is hardly unique to the WHO).19 Members want the WHO to be adequately funded, with control over
its finances. Nevertheless, they resist higher mandatory assessments, push unfunded mandates, and some are in arrears
in paying their dues.
Members want the WHO to exert leadership, harmonize
disparate activities, and set priorities. Yet they resist intrusions into their sovereignty, and want to exert control. In
other words, ‘everyone desires coordination, but no one wants
to be coordinated.’ States often ardently defend their
geostrategic interests. As the Indonesian virus-sharing
episode illustrates, the WHO is pulled between power blocs,
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with North America and Europe (the primary funders) on one
side and emerging economies such as Brazil, China, and India
on the other. An inherent tension exists between richer ‘net
contributor’ states and poorer ‘net recipient’ states, with the
former seeking smaller WHO budgets and the latter larger
budgets.
Overall, national politics drive self-interest, with states
resisting externally imposed obligations for funding and action. Some political leaders express antipathy to, even distrust
of, UN institutions, viewing them as bureaucratic and inefficient. In this political environment, it is unsurprising that
members fail to act as shareholders.
Ebola placed into stark relief the failure of the international
community to increase capacities as required by the IHR.
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone had some of the world's
weakest health systems, with little capacity to either monitor
or respond to the Ebola epidemic.20 This caused enormous
suffering in West Africa and placed countries throughout the
region e and the world e at risk. Member states should
recognize that the health of their citizens depends on
strengthening others' capacity. The WHO has a central role in
creating systems to facilitate and encourage such cooperation.
The WHO cannot succeed unless members act as shareholders, foregoing a measure of sovereignty for the global
common good. It is in all states' interests to have a strong
global health leader, safeguarding health security, building
health systems, and reducing health inequalities. But that will
not happen unless members fund the Organization generously, grant it authority and flexibility, and hold it
accountable.

Ensure predictable, Flexible, and adequate funding
By its own admission, the WHO is ‘over-extended and overcommitted,’ with insufficient resources to meet expanding
needs, and resources not fully within its control.21 The Global
Fund, U.S. Global Health Initiative, and the Bill & Melinda
Gates Foundation overshadow the $4.17 billion budget that
the D-G proposed for 2016/17. The U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention has more than three times the budget
of the entire WHO.22
The agency ran a budget deficit of at least $300 million in
2010/11. To close the deficit, members set the WHO's 2012/13
budget at $3.96 billion e nearly $1 billion less than the D-G
sought, with 300 headquarters staff members (>10% of
personnel) losing their jobs. Despite a quadrupling of global
health funding for the decade ending in 2010, and a doubling
of the WHO's budget, the agency finds itself in crisis. A combination of unfunded mandates from its members, growing
health challenges, a long-term rise in the value of the Swiss
Franc, and poor fiscal control all contributed to the current
predicament. The global economic downturn will only place
greater pressure on WHO funding levels, virtually flat lined in
the 2016/17 budget proposal. Such budget cuts severely
undermined WHO's ability to respond to the Ebola epidemic.
For example, the section of WHO that manages emergency
response was ‘whittled to the bone’ e reduced from 94 staff to
just 34 e due to budget constraints.23
The WHO's financing structure derives from two main
streams. The first is ‘assessed contributions’ to cover part of

its budget, the costs of which are apportioned among members according to each country's wealth and population. The
assessed contribution levels appear to be more a function of
political will than a careful assessment of actual global need.
The second stream, ‘extra-budgetary funding,’ is sourced
from voluntary contributions by member states and private
funders, and is often earmarked for specific diseases, sectors,
or countries.
The agency's dire financial position is not due solely to
insufficient funds, but also to its lack of flexibility in spending
resources. In 1998/99, 48.8% of its budget was from discretionary sources e the voluntary funds e while today it has
grown to nearly 80%.24 This 80/20 split undermines the Organization's effectiveness and flexibility to meet rapidly
changing health threats.
Having voluntary funding represent such a disproportionate amount of the agency's total budget is untenable.
Extra-budgetary funding has transformed the WHO into a
donor-driven organization, restricting its ability to direct and
coordinate the global health agenda. The rationale for the
shift towards extra-budgetary funding is clear: by tying
funding to specific programs, donors ensure that their resources influence the activities and direction of the organization. Donor preferences often change from year to year,
impeding longer-term strategic planning and capacity
building.
Extra-budgetary funding, moreover, skews global health
priorities. Assessed contributions are more aligned with the
actual global burden of disease than extra-budgetary funding.
For example, in 2010/11 the WHO's extra-budgetary funding
was primarily for infectious diseases (65%), with negligible
allocations for non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and injuries. Yet, NCDs account for 65% of all deaths worldwide, and
injuries 11% of the global burden of disease.25
The WHO's reform agenda proposes broadening the funding base by attracting donations from foundations, emerging
economies, and the private sector. Although worthwhile,
these stakeholders are unlikely to behave differently than
traditional donors, and will prefer to control their funds
through earmarks. Reliance on philanthropic and corporate
funding, moreover, opens the agency to the charge that it is
not fully independent.
To increase WHO control over its budget and better align
financing with organizational priorities, the 2013 WHA gave
itself the power to approve the budget in its entirety, rather
than only the portion funded by assessed contributions. A
financing dialog, concluded in 2014, aimed to increase predictability and alignment of WHO's financing with the Organization's program of work. It, along with more realistic
budgeting, was designed to reduce the impact of drastic fluctuations in voluntary allocations, while trying curtail the
ability of individual donors to sway WHO's agenda through
earmarked contributions. The dialog's final report offered a
series of recommendations, most of which the Organization
has not yet implemented.26
The ideal solution to donor-driven priorities should go
beyond these reforms, and would be for the WHA to set higher
member contributions. The Assembly should commit to
increasing assessed contributions so that within five years
mandatory dues comprise at least 50% of the overall budget,
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along with a top-to-bottom budget review to match WHO's
budget to global health needs and WHO's functions.27 Members could also give untied voluntary contributions above
their assessed dues and provide longer-term commitments.
Member states must become genuine shareholders in the
WHO's future, act collectively, and refrain from exerting narrow political interests. Failing decisive WHA action, the WHO
could consider charging overheads of 30e50% for voluntary
contributions to supplement its core budget. Although overheads are a familiar model in academia, the WHO would have
to guard against the risk that charges might drive donors toward other agencies. Whatever the formula, there is little
doubt that the WHO will never reach its potential unless
members ensure that financing is predictable, sustainable,
and scalable to global health needs.

Improve WHO governance: transparency, effectiveness, and
accountability
As a member-owned intergovernmental agency, the WHO
must be open to scrutiny, with its evidence, reasons, and
dealings with outside parties plainly disclosed. Disclosure is a
necessary but not sufficient condition of sound governance, as
the WHO must also competently manage potential conflicts of
interest, both financial and non-pecuniary. Most importantly,
good governance requires tangible results with clear targets
and plans for their achievement. The D-G's proposal for a
‘results-chain’ e standard indicators to measure outputs and
impact e is an important step. The WHO's proposed
2016e2017 budget included numerical indicators for each
program area and deliverables at country, regional, and
headquarter levels.28
In the aftermath of the Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, an
independent IHR review committee suggested establishing a
$100 million reserve fund for public-health emergencies as
well as an emergency workforce that could be deployed
quickly in case of an epidemic.1 Neither was implemented.
Commissioning reports is only the first step to accountability.
WHO must also follow through on recommendations and
adjust in response to past failings. Had the Organization followed the recommendations of the H1N1 Review Committee,
the response to the Ebola epidemic would likely have been
quicker, less costly, and more effective. Following the January
2015 Executive Board resolution, WHO now seems committed
to implementing versions of both these recommendations.
Stakeholders demand clarity on how their resources will
achieve improved health outcomes. Yet, an independent
evaluation graded WHO as ‘weak’ on key parameters, such as
cost-consciousness, financial management, public disclosure,
and achievement of development objectives.29 The reform
agenda promised to establish independent evaluations of the
WHO's work.30

Harnessing the energy and power of non-state actors
As a UN agency, the WHO is comprised solely of member
states, which govern through the Assembly and Executive
Board. This governing structure affords the WHO legitimacy
and influence, standing alone as the voice of the community
of nations in global health. Yet, this state-centric focus often

7

sidelines valuable stakeholders e public, private, and
philanthropic.
If non-state actors are not given a voice in the WHO, they
will redirect their energies elsewhere. This process has been
gradually ‘hollowing out’ WHO, as resources and influence
move to bilateral programs (e.g., PEPFAR), innovative partnerships (e.g., Global Fund and GAVI Alliance), and foundations (e.g., the Gates Foundation).
NGOs' lack of voice may also lead to poorer decision making. For instance, had WHO given greater heed to MSF's
consistent and unequivocal calls for a strong response to the
West African Ebola epidemic the disease might have been
stopped before it spun out of control. Failing to provide an
effective participatory forum for those on the ground impoverishes global dialogue and risks decisions being made on the
basis of an incomplete picture.
Beyond major competing institutions lies a world with
numerous stakeholders. Many of these actors have become
disillusioned with the WHO, feeling that the Organization has
not heard their voices and reflected their interests. A major
function of leadership is to harness the resources and energy
of key stakeholders. The distant and sometimes distrustful
relationship between the WHO and non-state actors could be
changed, to enlist stakeholders in a strategic alliance.
Non-state actors play no formal role in WHO governing
structures. The Assembly and Board do not fully recognize
stakeholders beyond states. This contrasts with UNAIDS,
which includes civil society on its governing board, although
with non-voting status. More recent partnerships, like the
Global Fund and GAVI Alliance, seat civil society, businesses,
and foundations as voting board members.

Multi stakeholder engagement
Currently, there is no single platform for dialogue among international organizations, states, partnerships, foundations,
businesses, and civil society. The WHO would be more effective
by giving voice and representation to stakeholders. To achieve
this goal, the D-G proposed a World Health Forum in 2011 e
multi stakeholder meetings under WHO auspices to increase
effectiveness, coherence, and accountability, and reporting to
formal governing structures.31 States, however, rejected the
Forum, while civil society feared it would advance corporate
interests. In its stead, the D-G proposed: stakeholder forums
targeted to key policies, separate consultations with different
constituencies, and web-based and in-person meetings.
To be effective, these proposals must influence the WHO's
agenda, priorities, and governing structures. For example, the
agency could create a meaningful platform for developing an
innovative ‘Framework for Global Health,’ adopted by the
Executive Board and Assembly, monitored by civil society, and
with genuine accountability mechanisms.32
Whatever the ultimate forms of engagement, they must be
fair and inclusive, ensuring voice for marginalized communities and resources to enable civil society participation.33
This requires transparent and representative selection processes, with agreed action agendas. And it requires proactive
outreach to disadvantaged communities least likely to be
aware of or have the means to participate. Without a
commitment to inclusion, civil society may be marginalized,
with the private sector dominating.
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Official NGO status
The WHO makes it very difficult for NGOs to gain ‘Official
Relations’ status, which is prerequisite for non-voting participation in WHO meetings. NGOs with this status may attend
Executive Board and Assembly sessions and make prepared
(but not extemporaneous) statements.
With limited exceptions, to enter into official relations, an
NGO: (i) must be international, representing ‘a substantial
proportion of the persons globally organized’ in the field, (ii)
must have a constitution, governing body, and administrative
structure, with a voting membership, and (iii) must have
major activities relevant to the WHO's ‘health-for-all’ strategy.
Even then, most NGOs must have two years of informal relations prior to applying for admission into official relations.34
This burdensome process often excludes NGOs that are domestic, poorly funded, small, or have a specific missiondeven
if they are influential. Currently, most NGOs in official relations are Northern-based.35
The Executive Board and Assembly should lower the bar to
NGO participation, and be more welcoming of civil society. It
could offer scholarships to developing country NGOs to
participate. And it could expand opportunities for civil society
input, such as by allowing extemporaneous statements,
facilitating NGO side sessions, and conducting open hearings.
In 2004, the Assembly postponed for ‘further study’ a proposal
to simplify the process for non-state participation.36 The
proposal is still pending with little prospect of success.

World Health Assembly ‘Committee C.’
Scholars and diplomats have proposed a WHA Committee C
comprised of major stakeholders, such as international organizations, foundations, multinational health initiatives, and
civil society.37 The objectives are to increase transparency,
coordination, and engagement of stakeholders. The two
extant WHA Committees are comprised solely of states, and
their business is concerned mostly with governance and
financing of the agency. Yet, the Assembly's mandate extends
beyond the WHO, granting authority to ‘direct and coordinate’
global health activities, while also collaborating with specialized agencies, governments, professional groups, and other
actors (Art. 2).
The Constitution grants the Assembly power to establish
additional committees, and to invite non-voting representatives (Art. 18). A Committee C would debate health initiatives,
give stakeholders a venue to present their activities and plans,
and discuss harmonization of activities.

reason not to grant them privileged access. For example, it
would be inappropriate for the food or marketing industries to
fund nutrition guidelines. Contributors finance areas of their
own interest, and companies may profit by influencing WHO
decision-making. The Executive Board should design a clear,
transparent process for managing conflicts, including monitoring and enforcement.
Although foundations do not have the same potential for
conflicts as the private sector, they can still exercise considerable influence. Wealthy philanthropists such as Bill Gates and
Michael Bloomberg donate vast resources, but they can also
skew the world health agenda. For example, the Gates Foundation and other undisclosed sources helped fund the WHO
blueprint for reform, raising the question of whether there is
sufficient separation between the interests of the WHO and
wealthy donors, which are not fully transparent or accountable.

Staffing: from technical excellence to global leadership
The Secretariat has evolved a culture of technical excellence
and country-level support, comprised of gifted scientists, epidemiologists, and physicians. As vital as these functions are,
global leadership requires much more, such as setting priorities, harmonizing fragmented activities, and influencing
stakeholders e all complex and difficult challenges.
The reform agenda stresses human capital, which is at the
heart of the WHO's strength and credibility. The promise of
better recruitment and retention, however, omits two critical
problems. First, the Organization's financial crisis prompted a
major downsizing of personnel, and it is unclear how current
staff levels can meet the burgeoning health challenges facing
the agency. Without a major influx of resources, the Secretariat
can neither expand nor even retain highly professional staff.
Second, the reform fails to tackle the kinds of human resources needed in a modern globalized world. In addition to
scientific excellence, the WHO needs highly accomplished
lawyers, diplomats, mediators, and economists, as well as
experts in trade, intellectual property, human rights, and
other disciplines. Although the WHO does have staff with
such skills (e.g., the General Counsel's Office, the International
Health Regulations, and human rights), they are not broadly
represented across the agency.
The Organization's reluctance to develop norms may well
be because it lacks the requisite funding and expertise, and
does not see its comparative advantage over other UN institutions. Yet, that is a design choice in setting its agenda,
allocating its resources, and developing its workforce. It is not
reflected in the WHO's constitutional mandate.

Conflicts of interest
Conflict of interest is a vital ethical concern for WHO governance, as perceptions of probity underpin the confidence
others bestow on the Organization. The WHO must be careful
to ensure that cooperating entities are genuinely devoted to
the public interest, without pecuniary or other competing interests.38 Although true for all groups, it is especially pertinent
when engaging the private sector, such as the food, alcoholic
beverage, pharmaceutical, and biotechnology industries. (The
WHO already has strict rules to exclude tobacco companies or
those funded by them.) The WHO has a duty to set and oversee
health and safety standards for businesses, which is another

Toward a healthy future
The West African Ebola epidemic highlights some of the systemic problems plaguing the WHO. The failure of one of Organization's signature treaties (the IHR) illustrates the
Organization's institutional weakness as well as the failure of
states to comply with their obligations. Too little, and excessively earmarked, funding undermined the response to the
epidemic by reducing the organization's ability to adapt to
new priorities. And the WHO's own internal decisions on such
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issues as civil society engagement made it harder for individuals and organizations on the ground to be heard.
Political support is essential to overcome formidable barriers to change. While the G8 previously dominated, today the
G20 could become transformative. Emerging powers such as
Brazil, India, and South Africa have interests that diverge from
the neoliberal model. They could demand a new deal e
perhaps a ‘Bretton Woods II’ accord for global health.39 Nearly
70 years ago in Bretton Woods, the world's powers formed the
World Bank Group. Today, a different set of powerful actors
could place health and development at the center of global
governance.
Achieving the necessary political support will require
more than a shifting set of actors, however. In some respects,
epidemic response, and emergency preparedness more
generally, are the low-hanging fruit, for which the benefits to
member states are most evident e and the necessity of international cooperation is the clearest. Empowering the
WHO to address more systemic global health needs, e.g.,
universal health coverage, will require politicians to elevate
health to a higher priority. Further it will require a popular
understanding of health (and not just infectious disease) as a
global public good rather than as a purely domestic matter.
This will only be achieved if leaders can effectively engage
civil society, the private sector, governments and individuals. Overcoming the global system's current inertia
will not be easy, but it could pay extraordinary dividends.
Despite progress, serious questions remain about whether
the WHO reform process will make a meaningful difference.
While the WHO established measurable programmatic targets
and took measures to align its funding with priorities,
assessed contributions in the 2016/17 budget were unchanged
from the previous budget. The Organization's revised framework of engagement with non-state actors presented to the
Executive Board in January focuses on institutional integrity,
necessary to build trust. Yet it avoids fundamental reform on
engaging civil society.40
Yet if it is to hold its rightful place as the global health
leader, including positioning itself to respond effectively to
the next epidemic, WHO must undergo fundamental reform.
Member states hold the future of the WHO in their hands. If
they invest in and support the Organization, it would pay
dividends in health security and human well-being. The
WHO's current malaise can be overcome. Members would
guarantee its future by acting as shareholders; the Secretariat
would govern itself well, while exercising normative influence
within and beyond the health sector; the governing bodies
would actively engage stakeholders; and the Assembly would
ensure the resources and flexibility needed to meet evolving
health challenges.
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